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Draft:  comments welcomed 
 
In November of 1934, over successive Thursdays, the 26-year-old Willard van 
Orman Quine gave three “Lectures on Carnap” at Harvard University, the ostensive 
aim of which was a presentation of the “central doctrine” of Carnap’s Logische 
Syntax der Sprache, “that philosophy is syntax.”  These were among Quine’s very 
first public lectures, and they constituted the American premier of Carnap’s logische 
Syntax program.1 
                                                
1 The lectures were published only in 1990, in Quine, W. v. O., and Carnap, R., Dear Carnap, Dear 
Van:  The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work.  Edited, with an introduction, by R. 
Creath (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1990), 45-103.  Unless otherwise indicated, 
page references below are to this volume;  the passages quoted above are on p. 47.  The lectures 
have been discussed by Richard Creath (see the introduction to his 1990 and “The Initial 
Reception of Carnap’s Doctrine of Analyticity,” Nous 21(4):  477-499) and Peter Hylton (see his 
“The Defensible Province of Philosophy’:  Quine’s 1934 Lectures On Carnap,” in Floyd, J. and 
Shieh, S. (Eds.), Future Pasts:  The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy.  
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2001), 257-275.) 
  Note that this was the American premier, as opposed to its premier in English.  Glimpses of 
the logical syntax program were available already in January of 1934, in Carnap’s paper in the 
first issue Philosophy of Science, “On the Character of Philosophic Problems,” translated from 
Carnap’s German by the journal’s editor, William Malisoff (Philosophy of Science 1(1), 1934: 5-
19).  On October 8th, 10th, and 12th of 1934 Carnap outlined the logische Syntax program in a 
series of lectures at the University of London arranged by Susan Stebbing;  a revised form of 
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As such, these lectures are of considerable significance to the history of analytic 
philosophy.  They show, for example, one way Carnap’s syntactical program was 
presented and understood in the 1930s, and indeed they show how Quine, emerging 
even in 1934 as one of America’s brightest logicians, understood that particular 
project.  Moreover, they promise to tell something about how Quine himself was 
thinking about central philosophical issues—the a priori, analyticity, and 
philosophy itself—early in his career, before he wrote the papers and books on those 
topics that made him famous.2 
                                                                                                                                                       
these lectures were published in 1935 in R. Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (London:  
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co, 1935) (C. A. M. Maund and L. W. Reeves provided a 
contemporary account in their “Report of Lectures on Philosophy and Logical Syntax … by 
Professor Rudolf Carnap,” Analysis 2(3) 1934, 42-48).  There was, finally, Quine’s brief review of 
Logische Syntax der Sprache (The Philosophical Review (XLIV) 1934, 394-397), which appeared 
in xxxx of 1934. 
2 The first of Quine’s best-known papers, “Truth By Convention,” was written in  the months 
following the “Lectures on Carnap” and develops the main ideas of the first lecture (see O. H. Lee 
(Ed.), Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead (New York:  Longman’s, 1936), pp. 90-124.  
Reprinted in Quine, W. v. O., The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, revised and enlarged 
edition (Cambridge, Ma.:  Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 77-106.  Page references below 
are to Quine (1976).  On the provenance of “Truth by Convention” see Quine, W. v. O.  The Time 
of My Life:  An Autobiography (Cambridge, Ma.:  MIT Press, 1985), pp. 121-122, and 
“Autobiography of W. V. Quine,” in Hahn, L. E. and Schilpp, P. A. (Eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. 
Quine (La Salle, Ill.:  Open Court Press, 1986), pp. 1-46, p. 16). 
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This paper takes up this last topic.  My aim is to reconstruct and understand 
how Quine was thinking about the a priori, analyticity, and philosophy itself in 
1934, what he aimed to accomplish in the “Lectures on Carnap,” and the 
considerable extent to which he accomplished that aim.  What Quine accomplished, 
in short, was the outline of a fascinating and original anti-metaphysics, with 
conventionalism (specifically, implicit definition) at its heart.  This was an anti-
metaphysics that invited (but, significantly, could not demand) adoption of a 
particular conception of philosophy. 
My reconstruction of Quine’s early views provokes comparisons with his later 
papers, notably “Truth by Convention,” “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” and “Carnap 
on Logical Truth.”  What happened to Quine’s early metaphysics, and why?  I’ll 
pursue the comparisons below, considering “Truth by Convention” in some detail 
and the others more programmatically. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
In later autobiographical asides Quine described the  “Lectures on Carnap” as “uncritical” 
[ref] and “abjectly sequacious” to Carnap (“Two Dogmas in Retrospect,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 25 (1991), pp. 265-274, p. 266), and recalled “Truth by Convention,” in contrast, as 
“[drawing] upon the lectures but show[ing] already the beginnings of my misgivings over 
analyticity;  the seeds of my apostasy” (1986, p.16).  As we will see below, these descriptions are 
misleading.  The “Lectures on Carnap” develop a distinctly Quinean theme in light of Carnap’s 
logische syntax program (indeed, Quine’s central, first, lecture addresses Logische Syntax der 
Sprache only obliquely), and (as Richard Creath has argued), “Truth by Convention” in turn 
develops rather than departs from the themes embraced in the “Lectures on Carnap.” 
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I.  Convention, Choice, and Metaphysics 
Near the start of the first of his three “Lectures on Carnap,” titled “The A 
Priori,” Quine suggests that this lecture is merely propaedeutic:  “I will,” he says, 
“present none of Carnap’s actual work this time, but will attempt only to put [the 
doctrine that philosophy is syntax] in a suitable setting.”  “In the remaining two 
lectures,” he adds, “we can get into the details of Carnap’s own developments.”3   
The “setting” Quine constructs in this first lecture, however, is vital to the 
lectures as a whole;  it provides Quine’s strategy for accounting for the a priori by 
means of analyticity and a conception of philosophy in harmony with that strategy.  
In the remaining two lectures Quine explores Carnap’s logische Syntax program, 
emphasizing the prevalence of quasi-syntactic statements—statements about 
objects that can be recast, loosely speaking, as statements about the syntactical 
properties of expressions—and displaying the benefits of adopting their syntactic 
correlates.  But these aspects of the logische Syntax program are presented as 
implementations of a project outlined in the first lecture, a lecture strikingly 
detached from both the technical apparatus and the broader theme’s of Carnap’s 
logische Syntax program.  In short, the setting Quine offers in this first lecture for 
the logische Syntax program in this first lecture is important and his own. 
The specific task of the first lecture is a demonstration of how the a priori 
sentences of our language, those which (as Quine puts it, quoting Kant) have “the 
                                                
3 P. 47. 
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character of an inward necessity,”4 can be made analytically true sentences, that is, 
sentences true by definition.  Quine believes such a demonstration will have two 
distinct benefits, although he does not describe the benefits as such and they are 
not, initially at least, easily discerned.  One benefit Quine believes would follow 
from a demonstration that all the a priori sentences can be rendered true by 
definition is a thoroughly non-metaphysical account of the a priori.  It is non-
metaphysical in that it makes possible a completely transparent account of the a 
priori—an account free of any sort of theory, or, we might even say, any story about 
what makes these sentences true.  Showing how we could have made some a priori 
sentence true by means of a convention entirely within our control (some definition), 
eliminates any call for a further metaphysical account, i.e. some story about what 
makes the sentence true a priori. 
Second, a demonstration that a priori truths can be rendered truths by definition 
would clarify the nature of philosophy, specifically, the sense in which philosophy 
can be understood as logical syntax.  It’s Quine’s view, in 1934, that philosophy 
forwards statements, and indeed a priori statements distinct from scientific claims.  
Our capacity to render all a priori claims true as a matter of definition provides one 
simple sense in which philosophy is syntax:  true philosophical claims are, as such, 
wholly as a matter of definitional, i.e. syntactical, choices.  But there is a more 
subtle sense in which philosophy is involved with syntax, one that emerges with 
reflection upon the conventional aspect of definition.  Definition is rife with choice.  
                                                
4 P. 47. 
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There are, as Quine will emphasize, many truths we might seek, or decline, to 
render true by definition, and there are many adequate ways to render those truths 
analytic.  If philosophical claims are rendered analytic, they will have been so by 
virtue of a conventional, syntactical, choice.  Philosophy’s status as syntax, then,  
depends upon our wholly syntactical choices. 
Let us see more precisely how both these benefits emerge then in the course of 
the first lecture.  Quine’s overall aim in that lecture, recall, is to bring definition to 
bear on a priori sentences in a way that illuminates the epistemological status of 
the a priori and thus philosophy itself.  The central apparatus for this is what 
Quine terms implicit, as opposed to explicit, definition.5  Explicit definition reflects 
the notion that to define a term K is to show how, in principle, to eliminate it.  To do 
this requires associating K with an expression containing only other terms, such 
that the latter expression can be put in place of K in every context in which K 
occurs.  As an example, Quine considers ‘momentum’:  “The definition of momentum 
as mass times velocity” “is a linguistic convention whereby the word ‘momentum’ is 
introduced as an arbitrary abbreviation for the compound expression ‘mass times 
velocity’”(48).  Explicit definition of K renders the definiendum a notational 
                                                
5 In “Truth by Convention,” implicit definition is postulation and explicit definition is simply 
definition.  In “Truth by Convention,” and thereafter, Quine would adopt the terms ‘postulational 
method’ and ‘postulation’ to refer to what he here calls implicit definition, and employ ‘definition’ 
to refer (exclusively) to explicit definition.  See below, pp. xx-xx. 
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abbreviation, and its use therefore requires that certain other terms, namely those 
in the definiens, already be defined. 
Implicit definition is different.  It reflects the notion that defining a term is to set 
down how it will occur in sentences or contexts;  we might say (although Quine does 
not) that the essence of implicit definition is not elimination but regimentation.  
Implicit definition thus consists in setting down as true, or accepted, certain of the 
contexts or sentences in which K occurs, and perhaps specifying a rule that provides 
for the generation, from those first starting points and previously generated 
sentences, of other sentences containing K as a term.  The result—the initially 
specified sentences and all the sentences generated from them by the given rules—
are then true by the (implicit) definition.  The implicit definition of K is the initially 
specified sentence or context and the rule for generating other sentences.6  Unlike 
explicit definition, implicit definition does not require that there be already 
available defined terms.  An explicit definition K is “necessarily relative” to “our 
uses of certain other words…  where the use of these words has presumably been 
already stipulated in the past” (49).  Explicit definition lets us render sentences true 
on the basis only of other sentences.  Implicit definition lets us start from scratch. 
Quine now employs an initially puzzling tactic, one largely unappreciated by the 
lectures’ commentators.  It is indeed toward the a priori sentences, the ones that, 
for lack of a better definition, have “the character of an inward necessity,” that 
implicit definition will be directed;  the basic idea is to use implicit definition to 
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render these sentences true.  But initially Quine broadens that target class of 
sentences to be rendered true by implicit definition.  And the broadening is 
considerable.  Quine invites us to follow along on a project of rendering true by 
definition not just all the a priori true sentences but all the “admittedly true” 
sentences, a priori or not.  If we start by considering some term K, the class of 
sentences to be rendered true by an implicit definition of K is the amalgamation of 
the “whole range of admittedly true sentences in which K occurs.”  This is, in fact, 
what it sounds like;  the “admittedly true” sentences containing K, or K-sentences, 
are just those “true sentences under the usual implicit, common-sense use of the 
word K, and true according to the given stage in the progress of science.”  
Confirming that we’ve stepped well outside the bounds of the a priori K-sentences, 
Quine adds that “the distinction between a priori and empirical does not concern me 
here.”7  So, for example, if K happens to be ‘yellow’ then among the accepted K-
sentences, each of which Quine proposes we render true by definition of K, is ‘Some 
people own yellow mugs.’, ‘Every yellow mug is a mug.’, ‘There is a yellow or a blue 
mug in Emerson Hall at noon on January 19, 1934.’, and so on. 
This is a dramatic broadening of this target class from a priori K-sentences to 
accepted K-sentences.  But it serves a purely tactical end.  A pursuit of implicit 
definitions of the various terms required to render the entire class of accepted 
sentences true will lead Quine to mount an argument to stop this definitional 
project at just the point where the a priori accepted sentences, but no others, have 
                                                
7 P. 49.  Emphasis in original. 
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been provided for by way of implicit definition.  And expanding the target class of 
sentences for implicit definition to the class of accepted sentences only to settle, 
down the road, for rendering only the a priori sentences true by definition gives 
Quine, as we will see, exactly the right perspective to show what he takes to be the 
syntactic (and, likewise, pragmatic and syntactic) character of the a priori. 
So the official project of the first lecture is to render the entire set of accepted 
sentences true by implicit definition.  Given the strategy behind implicit definition, 
namely, of simply setting down as true those sentences one needs to be true so as to 
define K, one might think that rendering the entire set of accepted sentences true 
would be a matter of simply by setting down the accepted sentences as truths.  And 
it would be, but for the fact that that set is (denumerably) infinite and an implicit 
definition is finite.  The infinity of the set of accepted sentences is not a 
consequence, incidentally, of adopting the strategy of pursuing the accepted, as 
opposed to the a priori, statements;  the set of a priori sentences themselves taken 
by themselves is likewise denumerable.  So the inevitable task is to show how to 
derive an infinity of truths by finite means As quine puts it, “confronted with the job 
of defining K,” our task is to “frame a definition which fulfills all the accepted K-
sentences;” by ‘fulfills’ Quine mean ‘implies’.8  
                                                
8 This adequacy condition on an implicit definition of K appear at first overly restrictive:  note that 
it requires that an implicit definition of K must entail, rather than merely avoid conflict with, all 
the accepted sentences containing K (materially, rather than vacuously;  see the following 
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The infinite is accommodated within the finite by means, of course, of the fact 
that among the denumerably many accepted sentences are those with like 
structures or forms, and these structures or forms are, in turn, finite in number.   
And to talk of structure or form Quine employs the distinction between the vacuous 
and the material occurrence of a term in a sentence.  The word H occurs vacuously 
in a sentence S just if S contains H and S “remains unaffected in point of truth or 
falsity by all possible substitutions upon the word H.”  Otherwise, H’s occurrence in 
S is material.9  Given the notion of vacuous occurrence, an infinite subset of the 
accepted truths can be captured by a finite implicit definition, provided that in one 
accepted truth in the subset a vacuously occurring term or phrase can be identified 
such that any other member of the subset can be generated by substituting a term 
of phrase for that vacuous occurrence.  The subset is then captured finitely simply 
                                                                                                                                                       
paragraph) (p. 49-50).  But in fact the restrictiveness is illusory;  various considerations 
effectively relax this requirement, as we see below. 
9 P. 51.  The definition is initially given for the vacuous occurrence of words, but bears obvious 
extension to phrases and sentences used within sentences.  In “Truth by Convention” this 
definition undergoes some refinement;  specifically, vacuous occurrence is contrasted not with 
material occurrence (offered in the lectures as a synonym for ‘non-vacuous’) but with essential 
occurrence, defined such that an expression occurs “essentially in a statement if it occurs in all 
the vacuous variants of the statement, i.e., if it forms part of the aforementioned skeleton” (this 
is, it turns out, distinct from non-vacuous occurrence) (“Truth by Convention,” p. 80).  
Interestingly, Quine seems insensitive in the Lectures and in “Truth by Convention” to 
grammaticality and, moreover, to substitutions for mentioned, as opposed to used, terms within 
sentences (or, briefly:  to wordhood). 
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by listing one member of the subset with its vacuous term or phrase replaced by a 
schematic letter (or similar placeholder), and giving a (similarly finite) substitution 
rule governing that schematic letter.  The sentence containing a placeholder for the 
vacuous term thus serves to implicitly define the remaining term or terms, i.e., 
those occurring materially in the sentence.10 
From this point of view the efficient approach to capturing all the accepted 
truths is, naturally, to identify the most pervasive structural patterns among them 
and exploit these for implicit definitions.  And the most pervasive patterns will be 
those we find among the truths that depend on a single word or phrase, the other 
words of the sentence being vacuous.  And these we have, of course:  they will be 
accepted sentences the truth of which turns solely on the terms associated with 
negation, conjunction, and the other truth-functional relations.  Put another way:  
the most efficient beginning for this project of implicit definition, with respect to 
regimentation, is to set down as true, in one fell swoop and with the aid of 
placeholders for vacuous occurrences, just those sentences that contain truth-
                                                
10 In many cases, of course, two or more terms will occur materially, introducing a question of 
ordering.  Quine thus offers the following guidelines:  “Relatively to every concept, either 
individually or at wholesale, the priority of every concept must be favorably or unfavorably 
decided upon.  In each case the choice of priority is conventional and arbitrary, and presumably 
to be guided by considerations of simplicity in the result.  Such considerations seem to point in 
any case to giving general or abstract notions priority over special or concrete notions, and to 
giving so-called logical and mathematical notions priority over so-called empirical notions.  Thus 
for example ‘two’ may be expected to be given precedence over ‘apple’.” (p. 52) 
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functional logical terms, and only truth-functional logical terms, materially.  Taking 
advantage of its expressive adequacy with respect to truth functions Quine thus 
proposes an implicit definition of the “neither-nor” construction,11 consisting 
specifically of a schema and a transformation rule, effectively disjunctive 
syllogism.12  The schema (or, more precisely, its instances under uniform 
substitution of sentences for schema letters) and the transformation rule suffice, 
Quine notes, for the derivation of all and only the sentences within the body of 
accepted truths that contain ‘neither-nor’ materially, all other expressions 
vacuously.13 
And with this we are off.  Since ‘neither-nor’ is by itself expressively adequate 
with respect to the truth-functions, the appropriate explicit definitions bring the 
remaining truth-functions into the fold.  “All such sentences,” Quine writes, that is, 
                                                
11 For which Quine (p. 58) credits Sheffer (1913), apparently unaware of Peirce’s 1880 anticipation 
of the result, then just published in the fourth volume of Peirce’s collected papers.  See Church, 
A.  Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University Press, 1956), fn. 
207. 
12 Presuming fidelity of the reproduction in Quine and Carnap (1990), Quine’s typescript 
apparently contains several errors, in both the definition (p. 54) and the expository derivation 
Quine offers a few pages later.  The corrected formulations are recoverable on inspection. 
13 Quine does not give the proof, but rather references without citation a proof of Lukasiewicz’s 
“concerned with a different starting point than A) and B) and ‘neither-nor,’” which can, he 
claims, be adapted to show the completeness of A) and B) (p. 55).  See §13 of Quine, Methods of 
Logic, 4th Edition (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1982). 
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all sentences containing only truth-functional terms materially, “become analytic—
direct consequences of our conventions as to the use of words.14 
We will return to the definitional project in a moment.  Let us pause to note 
what has been accomplished so far, at least by Quine’s lights.  Quine has rendered a 
subset of the set of accepted truths, namely those we would recognize as truth-
functional truths, true by implicit definition of ‘neither-nor’.  Of course, the 
sentences in question were already recognized by us as truths, so these definitions 
cannot be said to offer any discovery, any new truths.  Nor does Quine invite us to 
regard the definitions as reaffirmations of the accepted truths, somehow buttressing 
our conviction that they are indeed true.  What has been accomplished is this:  the 
truth of each of the members of this infinite subset of accepted sentences is now 
transparent, nothing more than the result of setting up a definition designed to 
make it true.  That is an act entirely within our control and, hence, our 
understanding. 
Here is a closely related point:  the implicit definition Quine offers is one of 
many possible definitions, any of which would be adequate in the sense that  it 
entails the desired class of accepted sentences.  Here is an obvious alternative 
definition:  replace Quine’s implicit definition of ‘neither-nor’ with an implicit 
definition of the expressively adequate ‘not-both’.  With explicit definitions adjusted 
appropriately, exactly the same accepted sentences are captured.  Or more 
drastically, we could start with an implicit definition directed toward an entirely 
                                                
14 P. 59. 
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different (but still infinite) set of accepted truths, forgoing the considerable 
convenience of starting with the logical terms, that is, those at the heart of the most 
pervasive patterns among the accepted truths.  That starting point was motivated 
after all, as Quine repeatedly notes,15 by nothing more than the pragmatic virtue of 
convenience.  Giving it up is inconvenient, but not mistaken, or wrong in any other 
sense. 
The fact that these various approaches, Quine’s included, to rendering the class 
of accepted truths true by definition are distinguished only according to their 
“economy and simplicity” provides the key to understanding what a non-
metaphysical approach is for Quine, or was, at least, in 1934.  The fact that there 
are choices, both concerning how to render a sentence true by implicit definition as 
well as concerning which sentences to so render first, shows that in rendering a 
particular sentence true by definition we are not revealing some alleged genuine 
“source” of the sentence’s truth.  The sentence ‘It is or is not Sunday’ is rendered 
true by the implicit definition Quine offers of ‘neither-nor’, but the same sentence 
could have been rendered true in many different ways, before or after many other 
sentences.  And this shows that in rendering it true we are not showing why it is 
true;  that is, we are not giving a theory of its particular truth.  That would be a bit 
of unacceptable metaphysics.  At the same time, however, we are showing the 
                                                
15 See for example pp. 51, 52, 61, and 65 in the first lecture;  also the start (p. 85) of the third.  The 
emphasis on economy and simplicity is particularly evident in the ordering principles Quine 
recommends for the implicit definitions of terms;  see p. 51 and fn.  9 above. 
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sentence to be true on a definition, and this is, for Quine, an entirely non-
metaphysical demonstration. 
Let us return then to the definitional project, which of course ends not with the 
implicit definition of the truth-functional truths, but has, indeed, the full class of 
accepted truths as its target.  Having handled the truth-functions, Quine proceeds 
quickly in this first lecture over the ground beyond, gesturing toward the additional 
implicit definitions needed for quantified sentences and noting, on the authority of 
Principia Mathematica, that these are sufficient for mathematics.16  Logic and 
mathematics covered, Quine proceeds, again quite programmatically, towards 
central “empirical words” such as ‘event’, ‘energy’, and ‘time’, the aim being to 
fashion additional implicit definitions that, in concert with those already in hand, 
entail those accepted sentences that contain only ‘event’ and previously defined 
words materially. 
Now we are really moving.  And “obviously,” writes Quine, 
 
[w]e could go on indefinitely in the same way, introducing one word after 
another, and providing in each definition for the derivation of all accepted 
sentences which materially involve the word there defined and preceding 
words but no others.  Suppose we were to keep this up until we have defined, 
implicitly or explicitly, and one after another, every word in the English 
language.  Then every accepted sentence, no matter in what words, would be 
                                                
16 p. 60. 
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provided for by the implicit or explicit definitions;  every accepted sentence 
would become analytic, that is, directly derivable from our conventions as to 
the use of words.17 
 
The question, of course, is, should we carry the project on to that very end?  And if 
not, where should we stop it?  Quine poses and answers those questions as follows.  
Past the point at which the sentences to be defined lack “generality” or 
“importance,” the benefit of according them truth by definition wanes;  “we simply 
would not bother” with these, he writes.  So the definitional project stops short of 
these mundane sentences.  But important, general accepted sentences may be 
spared truth by definition as well, Quine adds, if we suspect that they may 
sometime soon be rejected to accommodate “new discoveries in science.”18  In short, 
the question of where to halt the definitional project is shaped by something like a 
cost/benefit calculation, where the benefit of definition (namely, rigor) is weighed 
against the cost of concocting a definition and of having to “redefine and 
retrodefine” as the set of accepted sentences changes.  It is, Quine writes, “therefore 
convenient to maintain a merely provisional, non-analytic status for such principles 
as we shall be most willing to sacrifice when need of revision… arises.”  Otherwise, 
“[a]t every stage the entire conceptual scheme would be crystallized.”19  So we find 
                                                
17 pp. 61-62. Emphasis in original. 
18 pp. 62-63. 
19 p. 63 
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that the definitional project halts where it does as a function of convenience and 
simplicity—of, that is, purely pragmatic virtues.  It is not guided by any antecedent 
divide between the empirical and the logical;  indeed, that distinction can only be 
understood as a product of our choice of where to halt the definitional project. 
As might be expected, this pragmatic criterion leaves logic and mathematics to 
convention;  these we can cast as analytic, central as they are.  Certain heretofore 
empirical notions, e.g. simultaneity,20 should also be cast as analytic because, again, 
“of the key position which they occupy.” 21 All this has what would become a 
Quinean ring, familiar to modern readers:  our understanding of the world is a web, 
with center and periphery.  What is different here, and perhaps it is a difference 
only in emphasis, is that we make the web, and that there are many ways to do 
that—many possibilities for center and periphery—and distinctions of only 
convenience and simplicity between the options.  The way we construct the implicit 
definitions, and the parts we leave undefined, are entirely and truly up to us.  And 
it is on the fact of this choice that Quine hangs an account of the a priori that is, 
like his earlier account of ‘neither-nor’, profoundly anti-metaphysical, non-
theoretical, and transparent.  Starting from the observation that “there are more 
and less firmly accepted sentences prior to any sophisticated system of 
thoroughgoing definition,” Quine observes that 
 
                                                
20 cf. C. I. Lewis. 
21 Pp. 64. 
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[t]he more firmly accepted sentences we choose to modify last, if at all, in the 
course of evolving and revamping our sciences in the face of new discoveries.  
And among these accepted sentences which we choose to give up last, if at all, 
there are those which we are not going to give up at all, so basic are they to 
our whole conceptual scheme.  These, if any, are the sentences to which the 
epithet ‘a priori’ would have to apply.  And we have seen… that it is 
convenient so to frame our definitions as to make all these sentences 
analytic…. 
But all this is a question only of how we choose to systematize on 
language.  We are equally free to leave some of our firmly accepted sentences 
outside the analytic realm, and yet to continue to hold to them by what we 
may call deliberate dogma, or mystic intuition, or divine revelation:  but 
what’s the use, since suitable definition can be made to do the trick without 
any such troublesome assumptions?  If we disapprove of the gratuitous 
creation of metaphysical problems, we will provide for such firmly accepted 
sentences within our definitions, or else cease to accept them so firmly. 
Kant’s recognition of a priori synthetic propositions, and the modern 
denial of such, are thus to be construed as statements of conventions as to 
linguistic procedure.22 
 
                                                
22 P. 65.  Emphasis in original. 
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The a priori sentences, which Quine takes to be those sentences which we would 
“choose to give up last, if at all,” are rendered true on some implicit definition.  Yet, 
as before, in so doing we are not giving an explanation or theory of their truth, for 
that truth could be established as effectively in quite disparate ways.  The very fact 
of this choice, among alternative means to render the a priori true by definition, 
extricates the account from metaphysics and makes the a priori transparent.  Quine 
continues: 
 
The doctrine that the a priori is analytic gains in force by thus turning 
out to be a matter of syntactic convention;  for the objection is thereby 
forestalled that our exclusion of the metaphysical difficulties of the a 
priori synthetic depends upon our adoption of a gratuitous 
metaphysical point of view in turn.23 
 
Simultaneously, Quine’s approach to the a priori places him in a significant 
rhetorical predicament, insofar as he cannot, consistent with his evasion of 
metaphysics, offer an argument for rendering the a priori analytic, in the sense of 
offering grounds other than the pragmatic ones of simplicity and convenience for 
regarding the a priori as analytic as opposed to true by virtue of “deliberate dogma, 
or mystic intuition, or divine revelation.”  To offer grounds other than the pragmatic 
ones would be to deny us our genuine choice with respect to how we account for the 
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a priori, to insist, that is, that there is a particular fact or explanation for the truth 
of the a priori independent of our choice—and that would land us back in 
metaphysics.  So Quine is in the position of displaying the practical advantages of 
rendering the a priori, and, roughly, only the a priori, sentences true by definition, 
and imploring us, as we glimpsed above, rather than offering us an argument, to 
accept those advantages and that approach.  This, it appears, is the anti-
metaphysical predicament. 
Not surprisingly, this proposal to render the a priori true by definition also 
illuminates the nature of philosophy itself—philosophy, that is, as logical syntax.  
Quine has no antecedent commitment to a particular identity for philosophy, but 
insofar as we take philosophy to actually make claims and to be different from a 
natural science it must be analytic;  presuming we adopt Quine’s syntactic proposal.  
Philosophy is thus syntax in the sense not only that philosophical truths are such 
merely by dint of syntactical convention but also in the sense that it is the task of 
philosophers to explore the different possible syntactic systems and tally their 
advantages and disadvantages.  Indeed, this latter, broader, perspective reminds us 
that philosophy is syntax in the first sense only because we’ve chosen it to be so;  the 
very dictum that philosophy is syntax is thereby also exempt from metaphysics.24  
                                                
24 P. 66.  Here Quine puts the point succinctly:  “Carnap’s thesis that philosophy is syntax is thus 
seen to follow from the principle that everything is analytic except the contingent propositions of 
empirical science.  But, like the principle that the a priori is analytic, Carnap’s thesis is to be 
regarded not as a metaphysical conclusion, but as a syntactic decision.  This conclusion should be 
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Evading metaphysics, both in coming to terms with our deeply accepted truths and 
in understanding philosophy itself, is, really, the unifying theme of Quine’s first 
lecture on Carnap. 
Lectures II and III, “Syntax” and “Philosophy as Syntax,” respectively, provide 
accessible if abbreviated overviews of the main parts of Carnap’s logical syntax 
program proper.  Lecture II outlines an overly simple version of Carnap’s artificial 
symbolic language with formative rules (Carnap’s Formregeln) and a truncated set 
of primitives (including indefinitely many descriptive operators).  The implicit 
definition of ‘neither-nor’, in conjunction with a rule for substitution (which Quine 
indicates can be understood as an implicit definition of ‘all’,25) are cast as 
transformation rules (Carnap’s Formungsregeln).  Following Carnap closely now, 
Quine offers syntactical definitions for a slew of notions in this “specimen” 
language, including consequence, analyticity, contradiction, and synonymy, 
emphasizing that in each case what is defined, strictly, is consequence, analyticity, 
and so forth for this language only. 
The benefit of such definitions is, of course, clarity.  With the resources of 
syntax, says Quine, these notions are, for the first time, “sharply formulated… and 
put on a basis where we have full command of what we are talking about.”26  The 
                                                                                                                                                       
gratifying to Carnap himself:  for if philosophy is syntax, the philosophical view that philosophy 
is syntax should be syntax in turn;  and this we see it to be.” 
25 P. 75. 
26 P. 81. 
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fact that the syntactically-captured notions can be expressed within this specimen 
language itself—Quine here gives a rather compressed outline of the Gödel-
numbering and arithmetization of syntax—only underscores the gains in clarity 
syntax affords. 
At the start of Lecture III, “Philosophy as Syntax,” Quine returns to the moral of 
Lecture I, to wit, that our choice, “guided by considerations of convenience,” calls 
upon us “to provide for all so-called a priori judgments on the analytic side so that 
nothing remains synthetic except some of the propositions of the empirical 
sciences.”27  What seems to me to be a sensitivity to the rhetorical quandary 
encountered in the first lecture—Quine cannot, on pain of engaging in metaphysics, 
argue this particular choice, but is left instead to describe its pragmatic advantages 
and urge us toward them—moves Quine in this last lecture to, he tells us, “show in 
detail the form assumed by certain representative philosophic matters when 
approached from the syntactic standpoint.  By so doing” he writes, “I hope to 
suggest, better than I could by any dialectic, the constructive quality and 
importance of Carnap’s method.”28 
From this point, a primer on use versus mention leads Quine to the notion of a 
syntactic property of a sign—one, that is, that can be assessed without “going 
beyond” the sign, and from this we get the definition of a quasi-syntactic property as 
a non-syntactic property that has a syntactic correlate, that is, a syntactic property 
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28 P. 88 
Page 23 of 36 
which is true of a sign for some object just when the non-syntactic property is had 
by the object itself.  To the extent that the properties in which we are interested 
admit of syntactic correlates, i.e., are quasi-syntactic, our discussion of these 
properties comes entirely under the heading of syntax.  And this, of course, is to be 
preferred on the grounds of directness:  “[c]learly,” writes Quine, “the quasi-
syntactic is an indirect idiom, and should be eliminated in favor of the syntactic 
translation when we are concerned with a logical analysis of what is being said.”29 
On these grounds, Quine urges that the quasi-syntactical relations of meaning, 
denotation, possibility, necessity, property, and number be put aside for their 
syntactical correlates;  the problems associated with these concepts can be avoided 
within syntax, and this shows the concepts to have been “gratuitously invoked”30 
and to be “needless complications.”31  It is important to see that, for Quine, here, 
what is being offered is not simply an alternative, syntactic, formulation—even a 
clearer one—of some philosophical issues.  In bringing meaning, modality, and so on 
within the realm of syntax we bring it, on Quine’s view, within the fold of our free 
conventional choice, and thus give these notions the kind of transparency enjoyed 
by the analytic sentences.  And it is with that transparency that we loose 
metaphysics and the range of disputes that go with it:  “controversies about 
modalities,… universals,… the nature of number,… the ultimate given,” Quine 
                                                
29 P. 92. 
30 P. 94. 
31 P. 98 
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writes, “all become merely descriptions of dissimilar syntaxes, once the quasi-
syntactic is abandoned in favor of the syntactic rendering.”32 
 
Other Perspectives on the “Lectures on Carnap” 
I hope so far to have conveyed something of the state of Quine’s thought in these 
lectures, placing emphasis on the evasion of metaphysics, the significance of choice, 
and what I’ve called the rhetorical quandary Quine finds himself in with respect to 
logical syntax.  Before turning to consider Quine’s subsequent treatments of the a 
priori and analyticity, I want to contrast my understanding of these lectures with 
what Richard Creath and Peter Hylton, respectively, have had to say about them. 
In his introduction to the volume in which Quine’s lectures were published, 
Creath describes a tension he detects in Quine’s lectures, namely, between 
“Carnapian doctrines” Quine embraces on one hand and the commitments that 
“would eventually force him to reject” these doctrines on the other.  The tensions 
emerge, according to Creath, along several dimensions.  For example, in discussing 
definition Quine “explicitly sets aside all questions of justification,” although 
“justification,” according to Creath, “is the very core of Carnap’s conception of 
meaning.”  Quine also, in the first lecture at least, presents the logical syntax 
program within the framework of a natural language—English—while Carnap, of 
course, relies on constructed artificial languages.  Quine also “reveals in embryonic 
form a theory of knowledge that is both holistic and naturalistic,” which is quite at 
                                                
32 P. 102.  [reference to other of Quine’s work at this time] 
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odds with Carnap’s views.33  And finally, Creath describes Quine’s handling of the 
logical modalities as tantamount to a denial of their existence, in contrast to 
Carnap, who “rejected both the assertion that there are such entities and the denial 
of their existence;  both were metaphysical nonsense.”34  A choice of language that 
recognized the modalities may be pragmatically ill-advised, but it must, on Carnap’s 
view, be tolerated. 
It is indeed tempting to try and read in these lectures hints of the “mature” 
Quine and, accordingly, to spot the points where this Quine-to-come chafes against 
the embrace of analyticity in the logical syntax program.  But I think Creath’s 
attempt at that sort of reading isn’t supported by the lectures.  Quine’s central goal 
in these lectures, I’ve argued, is a genuinely non-metaphysical justification for the 
sentences to which we hold fast, a justification that appeals to the transparency of 
implicit definition and choice.  This is, pace Creath, a different thing than simply 
ignoring justification.  I cannot locate a passage in the lectures in which Quine 
“explicitly sets aside all questions of justification.”  Indeed, Quine’s appeal to 
implicit definition as the preferable means by which we should “hold to” our firmly 
accepted sentences35 all but explicitly assigns a justificational role, albeit a non-
metaphysical one, to implicit definition. 
                                                
33 Creath, p. 29. 
34 Creath, p. 30. 
35 P. 65. 
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To take up another of Creath’s points:, the attitude Quine adopts toward the 
modalities in the lectures is not obviously a denial of their existence;  Quine’s view 
is that the modalities as such are quasi-syntactic, and that their use thus invites 
speculation as to the source and nature of possibility and necessity, that is, 
metaphysics.  Adopting their syntactic correlates saves us from pursuing these 
metaphysical questions and that, as we saw above, in turn confers a practical 
advantage to forgoing terms like ‘possible’, ‘necessary’, ‘impossible’, and so forth.  
Quine does advertise the fact that under adoption of a syntactic over a quasi-
syntactic idiom the logical and empirical modalities “drop out,” “disappear,” or “give 
way”;  mention of them can be eliminate[d].”  But these claims, read in the context 
of the lectures, concern the practical reasons for, and consequences of, adopting a 
certain idiom, of which Quine, like Carnap at this time, is in overwhelming favor.  
Tolerance does not, after all, preclude criticism. 
It is true that what would become a distinctive difference between Carnap’s and 
Quine’s respective approaches, namely concerning the status of natural as opposed 
to artificial languages, is detectable in Quine’s lectures, and it is true, as Creath 
puts it, that “Quine’s view here is not strictly un-Carnapian, but it is, nonetheless, 
the framework around which Quine was [later] to fashion his sharpest attacks on 
analyticity.”36  On that framework, our accepted sentences  are arrayed in a plain, 
with those we are least inclined to give up at the center.  Moreover, they are linked;  
adjustments occasion adjustments elsewhere, and those adjustments range from 
                                                
36 P. 29.  See also Hylton, p. 264. 
Page 27 of 36 
benign to violent.  Yet the nodes, or sentences, are separable in all the relevant 
senses and the task of altering the web itself is, as we saw above, a matter of syntax 
and not science.37  But it is, as Creath’s comment above suggests, difficult to see 
that this particular difference creates any tension in the lectures.  It seems to be 
Quine’s view that this is a minor difference, since he describes Carnap’s preference 
for an artificial symbolic language in Logische Syntax der Sprache to be born of 
convenience, motivated not by any principle but by the de facto complexity of 
natural language.38  The  virtues Quine prizes in the logical syntax program—
chiefly, rendering transparent the truths we already firmly accept—are not 
sacrificed when the definitional project is taken up by us in, and for, our natural 
language, as opposed to in, or for, an artificial language. 
Lastly, on the matter of holism and naturalism.  The lectures are, pace Creath, 
remarkably absent of the holism or naturalism definitive of the later Quine.  
Indeed, although Quine proposes that we start the definitional project with the 
entire body of our accepted truths, he clearly regards these to be independent of one 
another in the senses relevant to holism;  they have their meanings independently 
and can be confirmed or denied individually.  Further, in the Lectures Quine clearly 
rules out of court the notion that philosophical propositions might be scientific ones:  
                                                
37 Compare the different use of the “web of belief” metaphor in Two Dogmas of Empiricism.  Some 
may find merit in the metaphor’s flexibility;  I am inclined to think that the flexibility is too 
extreme to be beneficial.   
38 p. 69. 
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“[s]yntax,” Quine writes, in providing “for everything outside the natural sciences” 
must provide as well “for whatever is valid in philosophy itself, when philosophy is 
purged of ingredients proper to natural science.”39  Naturalism is simply a non-
starter.40  Quine does indeed present the “web of belief” metaphor in these lectures, 
but this fact just serves, in my view, to underscore the metaphor’s malleability 
rather than reflect an early commitment to naturalism or holism. 
My resistance to reading the later Quine into these lectures might seem 
tantamount to reading them as written by a Quine wholly under Carnap’s sway.  
But I will want to resist that too;  instead, the qine of the lectures, as I will argue 
below, stands apart from both Carnap and the later Quine of, for example, “Two 
Dogmas.” 
Like Creath, Hylton detects a tension within Quine’s lectures, albeit with a 
different source.  There is, Hylton argues, “an internal tension in the lectures,” one 
revealed precisely at the point where Quine avers to implicit definition to evade 
metaphysical responses to the a priori.41  In Hylton’s view, Quine’s purpose in these 
lectures, in giving an implicit definition, is to “give non-metaphysical answers to 
questions about ‘the source of the validity’ of some of our judgments.  It is to explain 
                                                
39 p. 66. 
40 Hylton finds “no sign at all [of epistemological holism] in the lectures.”  See Hylton, Peter, “The 
Defensible Province of Philosophy’:  Quine’s 1934 Lectures On Carnap,”  in Floyd, J. and Shieh, 
S. (Eds.), Future Pasts:  The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy.  (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2001), 257-275.  P. 270. 
41 Hylton,  p. 258. 
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how we come to know certain sentences, or at least accept them to be true.”42  But it 
is far from clear, claims Hylton, how implicit definition could be adequate to this 
task;  there is a “question of the explanatory value of a notion of analyticity based 
on implicit definitions.  The starting point is a body of truths which we accept, 
independently of any system of definitions.  How could this acceptance be explained 
by the subsequent imposition of a system of definition?”43  A few paragraphs later, 
Hylton develops this line of inquiry: 
 
The tension we have found in Quine’s lectures could be phrased like 
this:  does the notion of analyticity have any explanatory value?  Does 
it, in particular, have an explanatory role in epistemology, as an 
account of the basis of the truth of some of the sentences we are 
inclined to accept (those generally thought of as a priori)?  The way in 
which Quine articulates the notion of analyticity suggests negative 
answers to both these questions (and such, I think, would accord with 
Carnap’s view of the matter).  His account of the purpose of analyticity, 
of the reason for wanting to construct such a notion in the first place, 
however, suggests a positive answer:  again, “enabling us to pursue 
foundations of mathematics and the logic of science without 
encountering extra-logical questions as to the source of validity of our a 
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priori judgments” (pp. 65-66).  Perhaps the suggestion of a positive 
answer is defeasible;  or perhaps the tension could be resolved by 
finding an ambiguity or unclarity in the idea of explanation, as it is 
deployed here.  From the point of view of the mature Quine, however, I 
think that no such resolution is possible.44 
 
Not surprisingly, Hylton finds that this question has ramifications for Quine’s 
understanding of philosophy itself in the lectures, which according to Hylton is torn 
between logical syntax and scientific naturalism: 
 
The Quine of 1934 is strongly attracted to the Carnapian picture of 
philosophy;  he comes, indeed, almost as close as one could wish to 
being a true believer.  [But] he is trying to square that picture with an 
inchoate view that is quite different:  a robust conception of the 
subject—philosophy as confronting genuine problems and offering 
genuine explanations and solutions.  The tension over analyticity, I 
suggest, indicates the difficulty of reconciling the two views.45 
 
But Hylton’s reading of Quine’s project in these lectures, like Creath’s, is not 
quite on.  Quine’s aim in presenting an implicit definition of, e.g., ‘neither-nor’’, 
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which implies sentences like ‘Today is or is not Sunday’ (a sentence that holds fast 
for us, indeed), and simultaneously emphasizing the convention, choice, and 
arbitrariness behind this presentation, is precisely not to provide some kind of 
answer to a question about the source of the sentence’s truth—that question is an 
invitation to metaphysics—but, rather, to disarm the question entirely by, in effect, 
declaring the sentence true.  Hylton’s presentation of Quine’s project in these 
lectures errs in saddling Quine with the notion that implicit definitions are 
explanatory.  Naturally this notion grates against the anti-metaphysical aspirations 
that run through the lectures.  But Quine’s notion of implicit definition, of 
analyticity, is not intended to be explanatory, and it can’t be expected to do 
metaphysical work.  It’s work, rather, is in freeing us from metaphysics. 
 
On Quine’s Notion of Philosophy:  Quine After the Lectures on Carnap 
 
My perspective on Quine’s “Lectures on Carnap”, with its emphasis on choice, 
convention, and the evasion of metaphysics, raises some obvious issues concerning 
Quine’s later, famous work addressing analyticity. 
Let us begin with some clear continuities between these lectures and Quine’s 
immediately subsequent work.  We find in “Truth by Convention” the bulk of 
Quine’s first lecture on Carnap, with, albeit, some technical adjustments, most 
notably a reversion to using the term ‘definition’ exclusively for explicit definition;  
what were implicit definitions in the first lecture are now postulates, and the 
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rendering true of some statements by implicit definition of their essentially 
occurring terms is now called the “method of postulates.”  Given that and other 
minor changes, though, Quine proceeds in “Truth by Convention” as in the lecture 
on Carnap, offering first a set of postulates for the primitive logical terms, showing 
how with a properly supplemented set mathematics can be covered as well, and 
then suggesting, with brief illustration, that the method is not limited to logic and 
mathematics but can be turned toward heretofore empirical terms and claims.  It is 
actually to this result that Quine has alluded at the essay’s start, in noting that he 
intends to question less “the validity of this contrast [between the analytic and 
empirical] than its sense.”46  In light of our capacity to extend the range of the 
postulates as far as we like into the empirical, there is no detectable antecedent 
divide between analytic and empirical.  This is a repudiation not of the analytic, but 
of any divide, independent of our choice, between analytic and synthetic.  We draw 
that line.47 
This much we find in the first lecture.  In fact, his embrace of analyticity in 
“Truth by Convention” leads Quine to express a point not quite developed in the 
first lecture on Carnap, concerning the immunity of this concept of analyticity in the 
face of changes in what we accept as truths.  New data will on occasion invite 
changes in our conceptual scheme, and with it reworkings of our definitions, that is, 
of what is analytic.  This is for Quine not the mark against analyticity that some, 
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having rooted analyticity in necessity rather than convention, might have taken it 
to be.48 
We find as well in “Truth by Convention” an emphasis on the various choices of 
postulates available to us for the task at hand, distinguishable only on the grounds 
of simplicity and convenience, and, further, we find the first lecture’s central theme, 
namely, the manner by which truth via convention releases us from metaphysics.  
There are statements that, for us, are a priori, that is, for Quine, statements we 
would not surrender at all, “so basic are they to our whole conceptual scheme.”49  
And “since these statements are destined to be maintained independently of our 
observations of the world,” writes Quine, “we may as well make use here of our 
technique of conventional truth assignment and thereby forestall awkward 
metaphysical questions as to our a priori insight into necessary truths.”50  This is 
precisely the crucial work accorded implicit definition in the first Lecture on 
Carnap. 
Of course, Quine does raise what he calls a “difficulty” not mentioned in the 
lectures, and often associated with Lewis Carroll.  In adopting these postulates—
specifically, in drawing from them the infinitude of truths we need—the postulates 
themselves are required.  The point applies across postulate systems, though Quine 
takes time to spell it out in some detail for the particular system he’s presented, in 
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49 p. 102. 
50 p. 102. 
Page 34 of 36 
which modus ponens appears as a postulate and yet is required in its own 
application to generate new truths.  Here modus ponens cannot be used on pain of 
an infinite regress, and the same result can be expected, mutatis mutandis, for 
other postulate systems.  Quine’s reaction to this insight is to grant the point:  if our 
task is to generate an infinitude of truths from nothing at all, or to show in principle 
how we could do such, then surely we will fail.  Quine is not much troubled by this, 
however.  For he proceeds immediately to describe a different role that postulates 
can play without risk of regress.  Observing conventions “from the start,” “through 
behavior,” “without first announcing them in words,” writes Quine, we can turn to 
postulates in a “subsequent sophisticates stage where we frame general statements 
of the conventions and show how various specific conventional truths… fit into the 
general conventions as thus formulated.”51  Thus Quine, in effect, distinguishes two 
ways in which we might attempt to use postulates, one of which is historically 
factual, so to speak, and encounters a regress, the other of which is after-the-fact 
and promises a non-metaphysical account of some particular truth. 
Quine’s sympathies are with the second sort of attempt, of course;  he proceeds 
immediately to call into question any explanatory value one might attempt to 
attach to postulates, a line of argument that would become Quine’s mantra against 
analyticity in the 1950s.  The point I want to make here, in closing, is that Quine’s 
attack on implicit definition, or the method of postulates, in terms of its explanatory 
value leaves untouched its use as a tool for offering a non-metaphysical account of 
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the a priori.  “Truth by Convention” admits as much;  between the “Lectures on 
Carnap” and “Truth by Convention” we have a difference not of doctrine but of 
emphasis, the lectures emphasizing the positive role of implicit definition in evading 
metaphysics, “Truth by Convention” emphasizing the explanatory impotence of 
postulates against those who, on Quine’s view, would look to them for explanatory 
power.  In Quine’s later work this latter emphasis dominates;  indeed, the emphasis 
of the Lectures on Carnap withers and disappears.  Whether it ought to have, or 
whether indeed we find in Quine’s “Lectures on Carnap” a subtle approach to 
analyticity and the a priori that we might dust off and adapt to our present needs, is 
a matter for discussion. 
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Endnotes 
